I put together a short video to clarify the radar evolution of the May 28 supercell southwest of Lawrence, which I contend was different than what Talbot presents. The interaction of both mesocyclones and their merger needs to be emphasized, and I show the progression to be similar to the Hesston-Goessel storm, as my ground survey suggested.
For anyone interested, the video is at:
Hi, Jon, thanks for taking the time to offer your views in this video. I meant what I said on Shawna’s Facebook post. I deeply respect you and have always looked up to you as a mentor. That doesn’t change even though I strongly disagree with facets of your analysis. That disagreement is why I made my own analysis and video presentation. Folks are welcome to discredit or ridicule me because this isn’t about my ego, or about accusing SLT. I honestly believe that lives literally depend on this. I stand by my claim that SLT made fatal errors that could have been avoided using visual structure identification. At 6:01 pm when positioned at that small church, SLT should have driven north into an area that visually contained no tornado, instead of driving south into an area which is characteristically typical of containing a rain wrapped tornado. If we don’t address that maneuver for the error that it is, people are going to die.
Identified below are times in your video that are main points of contention that are also crucially important from a chaser safety stand point, or times in which I’ve been misquoted or misrepresented:
0:44 “There were two mesocyclone… Talbot minimizes the northern one and its impact on the evolution of the storm.”
The “northern mesocyclone”, as you’ve identified it, plays a critical role in the evolution of and later development of the Lawrence EF4, which I covered extensively. At the time SLT was operating, however, this area of the storm was not the primary threat to storm chaser safety and should not have been visually identified as such, regardless of whether it was initially convergence on an inflow band or broad scale rotation from a new supercell cycle. This is the main disagreement that I can identify here, and it’s a critical one, because chasers continuing to operate under SLT’s and your interpretations and guidance are at risk of repeating these mistakes resulting in additional injuries or deaths. Arguing the technicalities of the “northern mesocyclone” without identifying the comparative magnitudes of the threats posed, misses the overall point of why SLT was impacted by a tornado and how that impact could have been avoided.
0:55 “Done in a cooperative spirit… yet singles out SLT…”
Indeed it was a collaborative effort done in a cooperative spirit, much like previous analyses of the El Reno storm. Numerous chasers donated their footage to the project, much of which I was openly critical of in terms of positioning, identifying dangerous maneuvers such as core punching and threats of impacts from rain wrapped tornadoes. “It’s very fortunate there weren’t additional storm chasers accidents on this event” I stated. Folks were cool with that because this is about everyone learning from their mistakes, even my own mistakes.
I asked Roger, Caryn, and other SLT staff for their help or contributions, but they chose not to participate. I don’t fault them for that. But you can’t say I didn’t go through the effort of including their view and material for the sake of having the best understanding of this event.
My presentation was not specifically for SLT, you or me, just as my El Reno analyses were not for Mike Bettes. I know it may come off as a personal attack given SLT being the subject of the incident, and the personal investments people have put into this situation. But it is indeed my intent to help other chasers and spotters going forward. I have nothing against Roger and Caryn in the past, have no reason to attack them, or anything personally vested in this other that my own passion for storm chasing. It honestly pains me to level these criticisms, but the safety message is just so much more important than folks’ feelings and pride. I just don’t want to see other chasers and friends get hurt or killed on future events for the same avoidable mistakes.
Unlike my analyses of El Reno, in which I covered multiple chaser groups, on May 28, SLT was the only group of chasers to be rolled by a tornadoresulting in serious injuries. That’s why I and others so heavily focus on their actions in particular. My presentation is about giving chasers the tools they need to avoid SLT’s mistakes on future events, using SLT’s mistakes as an example. Failure to identify SLT’s maneuvers as avoidable errors is dangerously reckless.
1:32 Significant convergence is noted in the velocity scan depicted there and no tight couplet is yet apparent. Instead, wide angle shots facing to the west show typical HP structure which chasers should have used to avoid a rain wrapped tornado.
1:39 The “large visible mesocyclone” has not been demonstrated to be the rotating feature you’ve labeled as a circulation here. Chasers’ shots before and after this time indicated right to left motion of an inflow band converging into the RFD to the south. Additionally, the outbound half of the northern circulation and convergence shown on Doppler velocity likely extended well into the RFD core to the south. The circulation labeled on Vagell’s frame here should extend south to indicate this.
2:04 The tornado was known to chasers and it was reported before SLT was impacted. I acknowledged this in my presentation, so I’m not sure why you do not. SLT also likely noted the intense velocity couplet, per reports I have from their clients. Overall, this is a minor technicality since SLT may not have seen or noticed the report before impact, but it should be pointed out.
2:19 The Red and blue circles to the left indicate a vastly more dangerous part of the storm than the red circle to the right. The left region represents a potentially rain wrapped tornado. The region on the right visually contains no tornado. This distinction can be made at a glance using established visual structure identification practices. Chasers failing to make this distinction risk injury or death, and presentations aimed at chaser and spotter safety should highlight this or they miss the overall point.
4:58 Both circulations are within the large comma head on reflectivity, and the comma head corresponded to large scale structure of the supercell. Helping chasers avoid that comma head circulation and its rain wrapped regions should be the aim of these presentations.
5:39 Your analog is consistent with the ones I presented, including the 16 June 2014 Pilger/Wakefield storm, 11 May 2014 Beaver Crossing, NE storm and to a lesser extent the 22 May 2010 Bowdle, SD storm. The Pilger example is a great example of a cycle resulting in a merger. The latter two events show smaller circulations arriving from the inflow band to the north, spinning up into tornadoes on the point of convergence on the rear flank gust front, before settling under established rear flank structure to the south. I suspect that this latter case is what happened with the Lone Star/Lawrence storm. Multiple possible evolution scenarios are plausible here, including that there was indeed only one mesocyclone on this storm the entire time. This should not detract from the overall safety message and critical clues that visual structure identification afforded.
6:27 “Is there some similarity?” Yes, but you’ve identified the inflow band curling into the gust front, on which there is no apparent tornado or tight low level circulation yet. It is the point of convergence into the rear flank gust front that is the likely spot for an additional significant tornado here, not regions further north under the inflow band.
6:30 “Although Talbot does not acknowledge it, there was indeed a danger area…” I did, multiple times. I said it’s possible for tornadoes to develop on rotating lowerings in the notch, even though one is not apparent here prior to SLT being impacted. I also stated that tornadoes are possible on the inflow band portion of the storm, and that it’s common for supercells to cycle in this location. I also said numerous times that severe weather is common in this part of the storm and that it is indeed a dangerous part of the storm. Don’t misquote me. I’ve tried very hard not to do that to you. Instead, the take home lesson here is that the area to the south is *more dangerous*, not that the area to the north is not dangerous.
6:55 “Bear’s Cage” term usage. The term is chaser slang and I acknowledge I may be applying it differently in some cases than other chasers do, even differing from Doswell’s original usage. However, I offered a detailed explanation of its usage along with numerous visual examples. As a storm chaser safety lesson, my usage is consistent in its application and purpose: to visually identify the most dangerous part of the storm associated with the mesocylone. The circular core of RFD on that HP represents the precipitation wrapping around the mesocyclone. SLT themselves noted the rainy RFD to their south was “wrapping”. That RFD was indeed the footprint of a large and deep mesocyclone aloft. You can call it whatever you like, but the goal here is helping chasers identify and avoid this region.
8:00 The comma head you’ve identified here is the consistent structure associated with both tornadoes that chasers should be most concerned with identifying and avoiding. The premature and evolving structure to the north is of concern too, but again, it’s the area to the south that is the most important and the most dangerous threat to chaser safety.
8:20 Comparison of positioning around the Lone Star and Lawrence tornadoes is valid because both tornadoes were contained in the same general portion of the storm relative to both the presentation on Doppler reflectivity and visual structure. Asserting repeatedly that the area to the north was a primary or separate mesocyclone does not refute the idea that it was instead an area of Doppler velocity indicated mix of convergence and rotation, consistent visually with the structure of an inflow band.
8:40 The structure is higher contrast in the lower frame, but the same pattern of supercell structure is still very apparent in the above frame. Chasers should have been able to recognize that at the time. If they could not, they lacked situational awareness and should not have been there in the first place.
9:04 “Talbot makes none of these distinctions” re: roads are better near Lawrence and Highway 59. In the route planning section at the end of the video, I did note that most chasers headed for highway 59 as the safer intercept option, and also noted the dangers of the road grid near Lone Star Lake. I extensively refer to quality of roads and route planning conditions in my previous safety lessons videos to which I also referred chasers. Again, please don’t misrepresent me here.
9:25 The comparison to Joplin is valid because it identifies a pattern of behavior *by many chasers* that needs to be corrected. Even if done for different reasons by different people, it’s the same maneuver Bettes attempted on El Reno: a north south transect of the rear flank core on a poor visibility HP. And the end result for SLT on Lone Star was the same as for Bettes on El Reno: a rollover accident with broken bones. The RFD core was indeed identifiable in other chasers’ shots on the Joplin event. If it was not identifiable by you or SLT, then a dangerous lack of situational awareness had been ongoing for some time as SLT was located within the tornado warning polygon for ~20 minutes prior to fleeing south. We need to recognize these incidents as patterns of dangerous mistakes, or more chasers are going to be injured or killed.
