Silver Lining Tours vans rolled in Kansas

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It is a good question. If you view the video in David's post #488, you'll see the camera swing to the west from time to time. The approaching tornado was invisible along its entire path through Joplin. As the van moves to the south (outside of the path) you hear one of the occupants say, "There it is!"

As to Skip's post #494, the warnings (by which I include both NWS and the sirens) were misleading that terrible Sunday afternoon. I have written a short book on the subject of the Joplin Tornado and why the death toll was so high. Its title is When the Sirens Were Silent.

To summarize,
  • A tornado warning (that was bogus) was issued on a scud cloud north of Joplin.
  • Under the "if any part of the county is under a warning we sound the sirens" rule, they sounded the sirens even though the projected path of the tornado was north of the city.
  • The TV meteorologists went on the air to say, "Don't worry about the sirens, the tornado is going to go north of the city."
  • People went about their business being assured they were not in danger.
  • Three minutes later the NWS issued the tornado warning that included Joplin but the sirens were not sounded so people had no way of knowing they were now in mortal danger. The tornado warning said the tornado was over Riverton, Kansas, moving northeast which would have taken it well north of JLN.
  • The sirens were not sounded again until the tornado was doing damage in a housing development on JLN's SW side. Jeff Piotrowski was instrumental in getting the sirens reactivated.
Take a look at this video from KSNF-TV.
[Unfortunately, there is an edit at :35] Their tower with the sky camera is north of the tornado's path and is able to see the tornado. They are broadcasting the tornado, live, but they don't realize that is what the camera is showing. When I interviewed them later, they said it didn't occur to them the tornado was moving into JLN until the sirens sounded.

As you view the video, Caitlin sounds almost bored at the beginning. Then, when she sees power flashes, you can hear her voice pitch change but she's not sure what she is seeing. When the sirens come on, it all gels in their minds.



Yeah, I always wondered why they didn't just keep going south, especially when a known large and damaging tornado was just to their west. Of course, I wasn't there, but that's just my observation.
 
The Joplin event should be carefully studied by every chaser, especially new and intermediate chasers. Like El Reno, the prospects of violent tornadoes were obvious under careful examination, but chasers were still caught off guard by the magnitude of the event, including chase routing when considering storm mode.

The Joplin day conditions were certainly supportive of violent tornadoes. Any supercell would warrant full respect. MLCAPE >4000 J/kg and 0–1-km storm-relative helicity increasing to around 300 m2/s2. by late afternoon. Throw in a moderate risk, "strong tornado" wording in the watch, an outflow boundary / gravity wave (clearly visible on satellite) and you have A+ tornado and Godzilla hail potential. But most important to me, the weaker winds above 9 km suggested HP cells, another red flag and something that would keep me from an aggressive frontal pursuit on the 22nd.

Not placing blame, just saying I would have been chasing further south considering the set-up and worked my way north, like I did during El Reno. Different stokes for different folks, but there is a reoccurring theme of late where even experienced chasers are "surprised" by something that should be obvious in many cases. The Joplin supercell went from producing a hook (22:34 UTC) on radar to a violent tornado (22:43 UTC) in less than 10 minutes. The forecast HP-nature of the storm made any visual confirmation or tracking of the tornado impossible until the last minute or less.

If the Joplin tornado occurred in more recent times of ultra-aggressive, fearless chasing behavior, it could have ended in disaster for many chasers.

This may have already been referenced, but Jon Davies authored an excellent paper on the Joplin events.

Link:
 
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FOX 4 out of KC just ran a piece about the SLT incident to mark the anniversary, and they didn't hold back from covering some of the more troublesome aspects and repercussions:

I thought the piece was well put together and responsible.

Believe it or not I just now read the piece linked to above. Why isn’t Roger Hill mentioned?? I am no attorney, but to my knowledge there is nothing libelous about mentioning the owner of a company that is involved in an incident, you see that in the news routinely.

@Skip Talbot and @Jeff Lieberman great job in the video!
 
Warren Faidley said:
The Joplin event should be carefully studied by every chaser, especially new and intermediate chasers.
I've watched a ton of videos (both chase vid's, and I'd guess you'd call them more documentary type) on the 2013 El Reno storm (some on the 2011 one too.) Plus read some articles online on 2013.... But honestly haven't done much on Joplin, maybe I'll sometime have to spend some time on it too then.
 
This simply isn't true.

View attachment 21135


The linked video above starts about a block from the gas station, which SLT had just left, with the tornado already moving through Joplin. A tornado warning for the soon to be impacted areas (not another storm to the north) was issued at 5:17 pm. The tornado crossed Range Line Road at about 5:46 pm. There was almost a half hour of lead time from warning issuance to where the tornado crossed behind SLT as they fled south. So either:
  • Somebody wasn't paying attention, perhaps because the tour wasn't in an active chase mode anymore
  • The warning was dismissed, perhaps because the tour thought they knew better ("storm will be undercut" or "the warning is for a different storm to the north").
Accidents happen, and we all make mistakes. But this idea that we did "absolutely everything correct" is patently false. Some folks need to take a hard look at why and what could have been done to avoid this situation. The answer isn't "nothing". How about we take responsibility for our actions so they don't keep coming back to bite us in the ass?


View attachment 21137

Pre-El Reno and in the panicky urge to escape, it's easy to excuse this, but we should probably also talk about why this route was chosen. SLT crossed Joplin's path *twice*, and needlessly. People in the van had already correctly identified that they had cleared the path of the tornado, yet there was this compelling urge to race northeast, blindly through the RFD core, to get back ahead of the storm. This is the stuff we need to fix. There's going to be more tragedies if we leave it to "dumb luck".

I think it's important for those looking to book tours to recognize that all of us storm chasers are basically self taught amateurs. There's no real training, regulation, or licensing for this, and you're putting your life in these peoples' hands. Make sure they have adequate insurance coverage, and if something doesn't seem right, you better speak up. Like, "Hey, why are we stopped in town for a pee break in an active tornado warning?".

So not to once again have to pull the, "one of us was there and it wasn't you card," but that's what I'm gonna do. Let's address what you purport to somehow be the only two possibilities as to why we could've possibly ended up in the situation we did:

1. Roger was absolutely paying attention. While the rest of us went into the gas station to try to get candy/use the restroom, I distinctly remember Roger didn't leave the front seat of the van. He was watching the radar which as you know, pre-SAILS mode updated every 6 minutes. This was a blindspot that was out of Roger's control. Now I'm sure you want to argue we shouldn't have been in that position to begin with, which leads me to my next point:

2. The active tornado warning was for a storm that we saw get undercut and posed no risk at that time. It wasn't a situation where we thought it was going to be undercut. It was a situation where it was already undercut. The storm that produced the Joplin tornado was not yet warned at the time and given the lack of updated radar did not yet display a violently tornadic couplet.

Now again, I'm not here to comment on what happened in 2019 because like most of you here, I wasn't there. I don't know what the thought process was or what lead to the decision making nor do I care to try to guess. But I was in the vans with Roger during Joplin. I do know what happened -- and as much as you may believe a forensic investigation into this solves the equation, it doesn't.

Edited to add: for clarity, I am in no way nor have I ever been affiliated with SLT in any official capacity. I was a guest on that tour in 2011. I am not trying to protect my employer or anything of the sort.
 
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All,

Kicking in my "one post every several years to Storm Track" to add my perspective and correct some perceptions. Full disclosure on 2 points: 1. I am a guide for Silver Lining Tours and have been in 2003. I was driving the lead van on the day of the Joplin tornado. 2. I was NOT on the tour where the Lawrence tornado incident occurred, so I cannot and will not comment on that incident.

That said, comparing the Joplin day and the Lawrence day in any way is misguided. Put simply, one was a chase, the other was not. At no time did we make any effort whatsoever to chase the Joplin storm. As soon as we saw what was happening, we blasted south, not to get into a position to chase the storm, but to get out of the way. Had there not been a ton of traffic in town, that would have been accomplished rather easily. However, there was indeed a ton of traffic, and that made it a close call. I won't lie: in 20+ years of chasing that was the scariest moment of my chase career. Frankly, it's about the only really scary moment of my chase career. But never was the goal to do anything other than get out of the way and to safety.

The decision to get on I-44 to get "ahead of the storm", implying that we were trying to chase it, is also incorrect. First of all, it was not at all obvious that we were clear of the tornado: it was pitch black, the tornado was completely rain-wrapped, and debris was flying above us. Secondly, we were STILL in heavy traffic on Range Line when we got to the I-44 cloverleaf and there was no sign that it was going to let up if we continued to go south. Instead we jumped on I-44, blasted 3 miles east, and went straight south on Rt. 71 to get clear. At no time was there ever any consideration of stopping to even look back at the storm, let alone chase it. We did not stop until we got to Neosho.

My full chase report, written that evening, which includes our path relative to the tornado, is here. Feel free to read and decide what our motivations were:

May 22nd, 2011 Joplin, MO EF-5 Tornado

This incident shook us all up that day. In fact, it has informed our chasing decisions ever since. On May 20th, 2013, we were, ironically, on I-44 again, but this time southwest of Oklahoma City. We were right on the storm that would produce the devastating Moore tornado as it formed between Tuttle and Chikasha. From the radar, it was pretty obvious what was going to happen, but based on the Joplin experience we wanted no part of chasing in an urban setting, and the storm was beelining straight for Moore. Instead of chasing it, we continued south on I-44. It was very clear what was / was about to happen on radar and we could very easily have turned around and driven right up to the hook echo but instead headed to the next storm in line, even though it was clearly not as strong as the Moore storm, later seeing a fairly unimpressive tornado near Bray. Full write up here:

May 20th, 2013 Moore, OK Tornado

Could we potentially have made other decisions at Joplin? Maybe. Perhaps we could have gone north instead of south and chose to get crushed by the hail core in exchange for a shorter path out, who knows. But to characterize our actions that day around "getting too close" or "core punching an HP", etc. etc., or that the situation is in anyway comparable to the Lawrence, KS storm is simply incorrect.

Rich Hamel
 
Could we potentially have made other decisions at Joplin? Maybe. Perhaps we could have gone north instead of south and chose to get crushed by the hail core in exchange for a shorter path out, who knows. But to characterize our actions that day around "getting too close" or "core punching an HP", etc. etc., or that the situation is in anyway comparable to the Lawrence, KS storm is simply incorrect.
Better idea: Acknowledge the mistakes, learn from them, and move on. The choices made that day - even if well intentioned - wound up taking 3 vans filled with tour guests dangerously close across the path of an EF-5 tornado. TWICE. If the group had been hit and people killed, we wouldn't be seriously debating the appropriateness of those decisions. I was with SLT on May 28, 2019. My van rolled 3 times and landed upside down in a ditch. Personally, I'd rather get "crushed" by a hail core.
 
Better idea: Acknowledge the mistakes, learn from them, and move on. The choices made that day - even if well intentioned - wound up taking 3 vans filled with tour guests dangerously close across the path of an EF-5 tornado. TWICE. If the group had been hit and people killed, we wouldn't be seriously debating the appropriateness of those decisions. I was with SLT on May 28, 2019. My van rolled 3 times and landed upside down in a ditch. Personally, I'd rather get "crushed" by a hail core.

In that situation, going south WAS the right decision: Here's the situation: You've got a mile and a half wide wall of water with a rain-wrapped tornado 2 or 3 miles away coming at you. The northern side of the meso, completely wrapped up, is already directly to your west, and the tornadic rotation is moving east-northeast. You have two choices: Go south to get out of the path AND avoid the hail, or go north, along side the tornado that has currently got a northerly component to it, hope to beat it, and drive into the hail core. In that situation why on Earth would you pick the northern option? As it happens (see the damage path in the figure I created on the link I referenced), the tornado turned more straight easterly, and then southeasterly. If you choose the north option and the tornado doesn't turn, you are in big trouble. I don't see the choice to take the south option as a mistake at all.

And the whole "TWICE" thing: In that situation you are chasing visually: Once we were up on the highway we quickly outpaced the tornado, which was to our northwest, and the road (and sky) was clear ahead to our east. Yes the tornado crossed the same path we crossed a few minutes behind us but to characterize it like we were being chased Twister-style with the tornado nipping at our boots, without having been there, is wrong. Once we got up on I-44 we were ahead and pulling away from the tornado and again, never stopped until we were miles south of the storm.

Learning from mistakes: See again the second part of my previous post about Moore in 2013 and how Joplin informed chat chase. We all make many mistakes as chasers. Those inform future decisions. All I can tell you is the Lawrence incident, from what I know of it from my many SLT friends and guests who were there with you, Skip's analysis, and Jon's analysis, is entirely different from the Joplin incident. It's a shame that Skip felt he needed to try and link the two to somehow reinforce his analysis of Lawrence, which apart from that erroneous linkage I thought was well done, and if you compare to Jon's essentially comes to the same meteorological conclusion.
 
Part of the problem dealing with the Joplin Tornado was the rain-wrapped tornado gave little indication of its presence to the general public.

If you haven't seen it, here is a video of a trucker headed west on I-44. He had purchased an iPhone the day before and placed it on the dashboard. As he approaches the Rangeline Road area, he drives into the tornado. He had no idea what had occurred. At 4:06 you hear him say, "What happened?" over the sound of the wind and the sound of the truck being blown across the road.

It is so dark the streetlights are on and cars are parked on either side of the westbound road.

While the tornado was straightforward from a tornado warning standpoint, it was far less straightforward on the microscale in the city as the tornado was approaching. The darkness, power going on and off then off for good, lowered visibilities due to high humidity and the rain-wrapped tornado gave it at least an El Reno level of complexity.
 
So not to once again have to pull the, "one of us was there and it wasn't you card,"

And the reason to not pull the "I was there and you weren't" card, is because we don't need to be there to make an objective assessment of the situation. I have the same data and tools that were used in the decision making process. If you have additional info that supersedes this, like timestamped photos and video or GPS logs, then great! Please share it. But I shouldn't have to point out that when you're a client in the back of the van, or a driver stuck behind the wheel, you may not actually have the best or most complete understanding of what happened, despite actually being there.


what you purport to somehow be the only two possibilities...

1. Roger was absolutely paying attention. While the rest of us went into the gas station to try to get candy/use the restroom

2. The active tornado warning was for a storm that we saw get undercut and posed no risk at that time.
Note below that the active warning including the Conoco's location was indeed for the circulation that went on to produce the Joplin EF5, and with a half hour lead time.

From Rich Hamel's chase log:
the attendants at the store would neither allow folks in, nor allow us to pump gas, because we were under a tornado warning. Of course, we’d been under tornado warnings for hours, so we were not overly fazed

So it's option #2 then. Ok.

and as much as you may believe a forensic investigation into this solves the equation, it doesn't.

It sure sheds a lot more light on what happened than these questionable assertions. Let's take a look at the radar:

This is the level 3 reflectivity and storm relative velocity as displayed in GrLevel3. The same data and software used by SLT staff during the Joplin event. The Conoco gas station is located at the red square. The route SLT took during the video linked above is highlighted in blue.

ksgf1105222219.jpg
At 2219z a tornado warned supercell is depicted due west of Joplin. The warning, issued two minutes earlier, cites a radar indicated tornado and includes Joplin in the list of impacted areas. There's a cell merger ongoing at this time, but the indicated rotation is indeed the area of interest that goes on to produce the Joplin tornado. This warning is for what would become the Joplin EF5.

The storm that produced the Joplin tornado was not yet warned at the time and given the lack of updated radar did not yet display a violently tornadic couplet.

So this scan was after the gas station stop then? There was 20+ minutes between the stop at the gas station and escaping south on Range Line Road? Or you guys had no data and were unaware this was happening for 20 minutes? Or you were only considering the "undercut" tornado warning to the north over Carl Junction and Webb City? Where was the tour at this time? Did you guys see this scan and warning? Because it looks like you didn't, or you wrote it off. Although the tornado warning text cited a northeast moving tornado, the polygon suggested storm motion east-southeast. The prior warnings cited motion to the east. The watch cited storm motion to the east. So I'm leading a tour and carefully watching radar. Do I decide that this is a good time to unload three vans of tourists in a congested urban area to go candy shopping?

ksgf1105222224.jpg
At 2224z the Conoco is north of the couplet. Did guys make it there yet?

Two more scans. At 2229z the merger is now a consolidated supercell. The warning is then updated, again citing a radar indicated tornado and reported funnel clouds moving east. A scan at 2234z and the Joplin tornado is underway.

ksgf1105222238.jpg
At 2238z the Conoco is north of the bulk of the couplet and most intense reflectivity echo in the hook ball. At this point you need to seriously consider what your best option is. Probably slightly north of the tornado, do you cut across the likely path, and then the huge RFD and flanking line core? I mean you're almost damned if you do, and damned if you don't at this point given the size and any possible deviation. I wish there were timestamps, but based on the videos, SLT may be just now starting to move south on Range Line Road.

ksgf1105222243.jpg
At 2243z SLT is likely southbound on Range Line Road, the tornado visible in clients' videos to their northwest. It's not like this thing came out of nowhere. A series of mistakes has to be made to be in this situation.

The decision to get on I-44 to get "ahead of the storm", implying that we were trying to chase it, is also incorrect.

That's not what I intended. It's obvious you guys were trying to escape. I'm trying to point out that these are ill conceived escape routes. There's this knee jerk reaction to cross the tornado's path to get to clear air. That was driven home for everyone after El Reno, but if you look back, there's a long history of these mistakes being made.

In that situation why on Earth would you pick the northern option?

And yet you wound up crossing the entirety of the mile wide damage path. Unknowingly one ensnarled intersection, one snickers bar away from death. That's what we're trying to fix here. Not drag SLT through the mud, but fix critical errors that are getting people hurt and killed.

ksgf1105222243a.jpg

And the whole "TWICE" thing: In that situation you are chasing visually

Before or by the time you're hitting I-44, all three vans correctly identified that the tornado was to their north or northwest, crossing behind them. You can hear this in discussions in the videos. I believe it was even you in the video from van 1 that says, "I think the tornado is right to our north". All three vans then proceed to head northeast on I-44 back toward the tornado's path. Yeah, the clear air is just ahead and you could make it. But it's three miles before the next exit. One Lone Star-Lawrence-esque tornado accelerating RFD surge, one blocked off ramp from death.


ksgf1105222248a.jpg


ksgf1105222253a.jpg


Could we potentially have made other decisions at Joplin? Maybe. Perhaps we could have gone north instead of south and chose to get crushed by the hail core in exchange for a shorter path out, who knows.

Not maybe. Definitely. It needs to be said over and over again, every season: If you need to escape, always pick the loss of all glass from forward flank softballs over racing a tornado across its path. Guaranteed crushed by hail > possibly crushed by wedge.


It's a shame that Skip felt he needed to try and link the two to somehow reinforce his analysis of Lawrence, which apart from that erroneous linkage

We look at past events to better ourselves by identifying correctable and fatal mistakes that chasers are repeatedly making. The two biggest errors that we see over and over again, including on Joplin, 2011 El Reno, 2013 El Reno, and Lone Star/Lawrence:

  • Chasing without situational awareness
    We were not even really chasing
    You take a pit stop mid-race, you're still racing. You take a break mid-chase in the middle of an active warning, with no visual reference, in an urban environment, and no well planned escape routes, that's fatal.
  • Escaping across the tornado's path
    we gotta get south NOW!!
    Roger panicked. Chasing was still in its innocent days before chasers started getting killed by tornadoes. SLT should not be raked through the coals for Joplin, and that's not at all what I'm trying to do here. Please don't get me wrong. But these were critical mistakes that need to be carefully examined in hindsight so that we can have the foresight not to repeat them. SLT took a woefully late escape route, and then raced to cross the full width of Joplin's path, either because they misjudged the storm structure, misjudged the radar, or simply had no situational awareness from which to judge (see above). And then to visually clear the tornado, and turn back toward its path through blinding RFD on a limited-access road, that's fatal.
But we didn't learn from Joplin, and we didn't learn from El Reno, did we? These same lessons about not chasing blind, and racing tornadoes across their paths would have prevented the Lone Star incident. It's simply luck that there weren't rolled tour vans sooner.

Do you think I like being berated and despised by the people that I once looked up to as heroes and role models? But when there are literally lives on the line, it's morally reprehensible to not say something. And when authorities in this community try to defend the repeated flawed behavior that endangers others, maybe for the sake of ego, or pride, personal or professional liability, it is going to be called out. Every time. Roger and Jon are probably never going to read this, and this is probably not going to change the minds of any of SLT's defenders. This is for the rest of you out there that look up to these people for guidance and example, as I did.
 
Rich Hamel said:
My full chase report, written that evening, which includes our path relative to the tornado, is here. Feel free to read and decide what our motivations were: May 22nd, 2011 Joplin, MO EF-5 Tornado
Certainly an interesting read. Kind of an eye-opener/gives some perspective of it..
Not trying to nag on you or anything, this is truly just a question...before the point og getting to Joplin in there it says "As we continued to chase in the wooded hills, getting almost right under one meso after another". Isn't almost right the meso getting a bit too close?? (might be my perspective only, as someone who would want to be overly cautious)
 
James K said:
I've watched a ton of videos (both chase vid's, and I'd guess you'd call them more documentary type) on the 2013 El Reno storm (some on the 2011 one too.) Plus read some articles online on 2013.... But honestly haven't done much on Joplin, maybe I'll sometime have to spend some time on it too then.
I've since been watching some vids & read some posts online, and just.. damn. :o
 
Story Map Journal

His fans and apologists can say and think whatever they want, but either Hill deliberately put his tour group in front of a HP TOR warned cell with zero visibility or he was completely oblivious to the only storm in the area with a history of TOR warnings and funnels on the ground. Then there's the wisdom, or lack thereof, of driving several high profile, lightly loaded passenger vehicles in a position where they would be broadside of any RFD from that newly developing circulation that merged with the older storm over Lone Star.

If he was smart he'll keep his traveling band of fail out of the area for a few years.
 
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