Legislation to Create a National Disaster Review Board

[Mike Smith]

Here's a preliminary report on the Texas catastrophe.

"We Didn't Know This Flood Was Coming"

...so said the chief executive of Kerr County, Texas, Rob Kelly. He went on to say, "We had no reason to believe that this was going to be a...

www.mikesmithenterprisesblog.com

This is a situation where I can't interview camp officials or emergency managers. Because fatal Hill Country flash floods are relatively common, what -- if any -- special systems are in place? Again, I have no way of investigating. We desperately need the NDRB. Write your congresspeople if you haven't already.

 

[John Farley]

I think the article linked below gets at some aspects of the problem.

https://www.kxan.com/investigations/conflicting-officials-social-posts-leave-evacuation-delays-questions-in-kerr-county-flooding/

I have seen quotes saying that the county does not have a warning system - despite the fact that 10 people died in a similar event in 1987. That said, it is not clear whether these quotes refer to a river warning system, sirens, or any kind of warning system at all. One would think they would at least have an opt-in system for warnings by text or email - most counties do - but I do not know if Kerr County does. I did see an online petition for the county to establish a siren system, so I would think that at least they do not have that.

I agree with Mike that this is another case where there is a clear need for a disaster review board. A perfect example of why one is needed.

 

[Matt Zumbrunn]

Here's a preliminary report on the Texas catastrophe.

"We Didn't Know This Flood Was Coming"

...so said the chief executive of Kerr County, Texas, Rob Kelly. He went on to say, "We had no reason to believe that this was going to be a...

www.mikesmithenterprisesblog.com

This is a situation where I can't interview camp officials or emergency managers. Because fatal Hill Country flash floods are relatively common, what -- if any -- special systems are in place? Again, I have no way of investigating. We desperately need the NDRB. Write your congresspeople if you haven't already.

I would also point to the Wimberly TX flood of 2015 as another example of Flash Flood Alley doing its thing. I am sure they will rebuild along the river and this will happen again.

 

[Mike Smith]

I would also point to the Wimberly TX flood of 2015 as another example of Flash Flood Alley doing its thing. I am sure they will rebuild along the river and this will happen again.

Not if we can get a NDRB, hopefully.

 

[John Farley]

Here is an excerpt from New York Times live updates that is relevant to both the local government and NWS aspects:

"In an interview, Rob Kelly, the Kerr County judge and its most senior elected official, said the county did not have a warning system because such systems are expensive, and local residents are resistant to new spending.

“Taxpayers won’t pay for it,” Mr. Kelly said. Asked if people might reconsider in light of the catastrophe, he said, “I don’t know.”

The National Weather Service’s San Angelo office, which is responsible for some of the areas hit hardest by Friday’s flooding, was missing a senior hydrologist, staff forecaster and meteorologist in charge, according to Tom Fahy, the legislative director for the National Weather Service Employees Organization, the union that represents Weather Service workers.

The Weather Service’s nearby San Antonio office, which covers other areas hit by the floods, also had significant vacancies, including a warning coordination meteorologist and science officer, Mr. Fahy said. Staff members in those positions are meant to work with local emergency managers to plan for floods, including when and how to warn local residents and help them evacuate.

That office’s warning coordination meteorologist left on April 30, after taking the early retirement package the Trump administration used to reduce the number of federal employees, according to a person with knowledge of his departure.

Some of the openings may predate the current Trump administration. But at both offices, the vacancy rate is roughly double what it was when Mr. Trump returned to the White House in January, according to Mr. Fahy."

The full article can be found at the link below and as far as I can tell, is not subject to a paywall. However, since it is in a live updates feed, it will move farther down below more recent updates and may be available just for a limited time.

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/07/05/us/texas-floods#texas-floods-warnings-vacancies

 

[JamesCaruso]

@Mike Smith - I read your blog post linked above - you mentioned the San Antonio office vacancies, and the NYT info that John posted corroborates the vacant positions, but according to the NYT the WCM was in fact a DOGE casualty, so not necessarily “typical.”

Your blog post did not mention the San Angelo office. I’m curious as to your take on how/where responsibility for these particular regions falls between offices, and also your take on the San Angelo vacancies - which I assume are not DOGE-related, or the NYT would have surely mentioned it.

 

[William Monfredo]

I would also point to the Wimberly TX flood of 2015 as another example of Flash Flood Alley doing its thing.

Indeed, just like October 1998 when dozens died in similar situations & locations...and the end of June / beginning of July 2002, too.
I lived in the Hill Country then...my stomping grounds. Boom and bust, drought and flood, the above book's an eye-opener, if interested.

 

[Mike Smith]

The National Weather Service’s San Angelo office, which is responsible for some of the areas hit hardest by Friday’s flooding

The Weather Service’s nearby San Antonio office, which covers other areas hit by the floods,

From Jim Caruso:
Your blog post did not mention the San Angelo office. I’m curious as to your take on how/where responsibility for these particular regions falls between offices, and also your take on the San Angelo vacancies


There are no fatalities in the San Angelo CWA. The camps, Kerrville, Hunt, and all of the other locations that were hit so hard were in the
SAT CWA. Having been completely misquoted by the NYT in the past, I'm sorry to say this is typical of the quality of their reporting.

There was no reason to talk about the SJT office in my blog because -- while there was major flooding -- there were no injuries that I know of and damage was less than farther southeast.

The SAT office had its MIC and had its longtime hydrologist. Those are the management positions that count in a major flood situation.

 

[Sean Ramsey]

"The National Weather Service has been hard hit by personnel cuts under the Trump administration, but that may not have significantly affected the forecasts and warnings for this historic and deadly flooding.

The two Texas NWS offices most closely involved in forecasting and warning about the flooding on the Guadalupe River — Austin-San Antonio and San Angelo — are missing some key staff members, but still issued a slew of watches and warnings about the flood danger.

The question is whether the warnings reached who they needed to reach.

Tom Fahy, the legislative director for the NWS employees’ union, told CNN that while he believes the offices had “adequate staffing and resources,” the Austin-San Antonio office is missing a warning coordination meteorologist — a role that serves as a crucial, direct link between forecasters and emergency managers."

Beleaguered Weather Service defends its forecasts as Texas officials point fingers over flood warnings

I'm pretty sure flash flood warnings don't get the same attention as tornado warnings from the general public, and I'm really unsure if phone notifications go out when they are issued. That flood hit so hard and so fast that anyone who didn't receive it or didn't react immediately never had a chance.

But, to Mike's point in the existence of this thread, an NDRB would be able to evaluate and modify responses to future events of this type and magnitude.

 

[John Farley]

I believe that there was at least one fatality in San Angelo. But more to the point, San Angelo is upstream, so what happened there certainly could have impacted what happened in the San Antonio CWA, and neighboring offices do normally communicate and coordinate in situations like this. Also the NYT article I quoted mentions that the WCM at the San Antonio office left in April because of the buyouts, and nobody is more central to warnings than the WCM. But again, as Sean mentions, the impact of these situations and numerous others we are and are not discussing could be evaluated if we had a NDRB.

On the point of phone alerts, it is my understanding that flash flood warnings trigger the WEA alert on your phone, like TOR warnings and SVR warnings with a DESTRUCTIVE tag, if you do not change the settings. At least that is how it works on my phone. That said, there are apparently parts of the Hill Country with weak or no cell signal. Another thing a disaster review board could look at.

 

[Mike Smith]

Using the StormTrack search feature, I have said on 17 occasions during the past five years or so that I feared "another Joplin" unless the U.S. began a National Disaster Review Board. Horribly, we may have just had it.

Per the latest, 59 people are confirmed dead. Eight girls and one camp counselor are missing. It is unclear whether anyone else is missing. It would appear that we will have lost about 70 precious souls in this disaster.

Yesterday I sent a detailed email to the Governor of Texas urging him to appoint a special investigations board and provided him with a list of the recommended specialties of the proposed members. I suggest those of you who live in Texas second my suggestion. Office of the Texas Governor | Greg Abbott

In January, when the helicopter collided with the American Airlines flight from Wichita, the NTSB went to work that night to collect the evidence they would need. I would expect their report to be issued around the first quarter of 2026. It will contain suggestions to the Army, American, air traffic control, Washington National Airport and others so this never happens again.

A National Disaster Review Board would be onsite in Texas today gathering information. In a matter of months, they would be able to make expert assessments of:

• Should the NWS continue with two categories of flash flood emergency warnings since, in many critical situations, they fail to issue the emergency level warnings?
• Were the NWS warnings received? If not, why not? Are cell phone signal repeaters or sirens needed in the camp areas?
• What were the camps' procedures during FF watches, warnings and emergency situations?
• What did local emergency and state emergency management do or not do?

Once all of this was factually determined, regulations, laws or other measures could be taken to prevent this from ever happening again.

Now, changing the subject a bit: The San Angelo office had nothing to do with camps' catastrophe. The NYT brings them up to try to imply DOGE which wasn't a factor in this case. Below is one of the maps that appears in my report published yesterday morning. I have placed an arrow pointing to Camp Mystic. It, and most of the other camps in the area (there are more than shown on the map), are on the South Fork of the Guadalupe River which revived 11"+ inches of rain. All of Kerr County is in the CWA of the Austin-San Antonio office.

The Guadalupe's North and South Forks are entirely in Kerr County. I have added a second map which shows how Kerr Couty and the Guadalupe is not affected by the flow from the north.

Please, please read my detailed report and make up your own mind: "We Didn't Know This Flood Was Coming"

I have been interviewed by the New York Times on several occasions and, without exception, I have been misquoted every time. I'm not talking about politics or anything else. They can't even get quotes right. Don't believe what you read ini this case.

P.S. As of noon, the death toll is said to be 69 with 11 girls missing (that's up from the 11am number missing).

 

[William Monfredo]

Are cell phone signal repeaters or sirens needed in the camp areas? What were the camps' procedures during FF watches, warnings and emergency situations?

We do need that NDRB. Still, much responsibility resides with the companies running things along the river.

NWS offices...issued a slew of watches and warnings about the flood danger.

A flash flood watch in the afternoon, flood warning after midnight, I like it, but who listened?
A sad situation, but personal responsibility also lies with the campers and parents, too.
I know though, hard to change holiday plans once they're set in motion. Tough scene at night.

 

[Mike Smith]

We do need that NDRB. Still, much responsibility resides with the companies running things along the river.

Thank you for the endorsement!

We don't know what the camp management did or didn't do. There is a report -- completely unconfirmed, so it is not in my report (link above) -- that the camps had flash floods plans. They have been asked to release them but they are refusing (I'm sure for legal reasons, if the report is true).

We know what the NWS did because its output is in writing (but we don't know why..for example, why wasn't the FFE earlier?). We don't know what the camps did or didn't do. The only hope of finding out and fixing anything that needs to be fixed would be for Governor Abbott to appoint a special review board.