Scott Overpeck
Quoted from thread on "Will Ike be retired" in the hurricane discussion forum.
I have responded to this here in a new thread because it is a long response and will probably generate more discussion. My goal here is to provide a different perspective and if moderators feel it is not appropriate, please remove it or do with it as you please.
It has been one month since Ike hit Galveston. I have tried really hard to stay away from this topic since I am a forecaster in the very office that issued the HLS with the certain death wording. I even re-issued a couple of HLS’s with this wording in them because given the data and facts we had at the time, it seemed very appropriate. I have had some time to think about the events during Ike. With that said, I have stayed away because I realize it is much easier to criticize from afar, anonymously, and do so without all the facts of the situation.
While I do not feel obligated to answer critics, here is more detailed information that we based the decision to use certain death wordings in our HLS. The evacuation area we issued the certain death call to action (CTA) was for Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula. It just so happens that Chambers, Harris, Galveston, Brazoria, Matagorda and Jackson Counties are included in NHC’s hurricane warning which is the basis for the HLS. We cannot separate counties from this warning as it is not our local office’s warning. We can however segment out other counties for hurricane wind warnings, etc. The certain death call to action was placed in the storm surge part of the HLS because of a number of reasons.
First let’s look at some meteorological data for some background. The first HLS with the certain death CTA went out with the 15z Thu NHC advisory – advisory 42. The track from Wednesday to Thursday has shifted more to the north towards Galveston which increased the storm surge for Galveston. By this time, Ike was forecast to make landfall between Freeport and Galveston. This was also when the hurricane warning was issued for the area. Ike was a strong Cat 2 for wind intensity, but had a large wind field. This was a unique storm, different from a lot of hurricanes with this aspect. The large circulation center did not end up contracting, but the thinking was still for Ike to become a Cat 3. So, 36-48hrs out, we are still thinking of the possibility of a major hurricane. Not only that, but the storm surge data was coming in well within surge values associated with Cat 3/4 storms not Cat 2. SLOSH had storm surge of 15-17 feet for Galveston, 17-20 feet for Bolivar, 20-22 feet in the Bay, and as much as 23 feet in Trinity bay and Houston Ship Channel. Some of the later SLOSH runs had similar values but there were a few that were higher and a few with lower values. It really depended on the track of the storm and the intensity. A track shift of 20 miles made a significant change in storm surge. Even if the track is right, there can be as much as a 20% error in surge values from SLOSH. So, at the time, we did our best to convey what to expect but could not pinpoint more exact surge values for a given location. Our HLS at 15z Thu highlighted storm surge of 12-16 feet from Matagorda to High Island with 15-20 feet possible in both bays. The range of 15-25 feet in storm surge actually did occur in later HLS to account for error in the track and to convey the higher end of the threat. It also applied to Galveston Bay. Yes it is a big range, but breaking it down would not properly convey the threats given the possible errors in the track at the time Thursday. By Friday when the track was becoming more evident, we were able to use SLOSH to narrow down surge values for specific areas. We knew that surge of 15-20 feet was more likely, but at this time, what if the storm strengthened to a Cat 3? Wouldn’t 25 feet be possible just as much? What if the storm shifts at the last moment (which it did, and was a big reason why the surge was not more than 20 feet in some areas, but it very well could have shifted so that the surge was more)? The point being that Thursday morning, given the uncertainty in the forecast track and any track errors, given the surge values SLOSH was predicting, it made sense to use the certain death CTA to get people’s attention to this threat. People were not taking the threat seriously.
Now let’s add some situational awareness to the equation. At Thursday morning, Galveston Co was doing mandatory evacuations for the west end of Galveston and surge prone areas along Galveston bay like Kemah and San Leon. The people in these areas were not taking the evacuation seriously and people were slow to make any preparations. The Galveston Co OEM kept telling us that people were not getting out that needed to get out of surge areas. The people were not taking the threat of surge seriously. Galveston Co ended up issuing mandatory evacuations for all of Galveston starting noon Thursday which was after we issued the certain death CTA with the hurricane warning. People started to evacuate by this point. Given the meteorology and the fact that people were not evacuating, we continued the certain death CTA. People needed to get going and get out of surge prone areas. Let’s also add to the fact that this area had not had a major hurricane since Alicia in 1983. People here have no reference to what 15 feet of water will do to their houses if you only live at 4 feet above sea level. We have a major hurricane awareness conference every year in Houston, and do many preparedness talks every year, but people do not care until it is about to happen and by then it is too late. It had not happened to them for 25 years, a whole generation of people that have no clue about what a hurricane like Ike will do. You can remind them of Katrina all you want, but people here remember how Rita missed this area and they were stuck in traffic for 18 hours. At this point, as much as you tell people to be prepared ahead of time, it does no good when all they know is a traffic jam during the Rita evacuation. So, that leaves us with putting a seriously grim call to action to get people to understand the situation. Most of the general public have no reference for storm surge or any situational awareness to tell them to get out if 17 ft of water is coming for them. If you live on Bolivar where you are 3-5ft above sea level, and there is 17 feet of water not to mention wave action on top of that coming for you, you need to get off of Bolivar. No matter how high your house is built or how well, 12 feet of water will remove your house off its foundation. This also does not account for the possibility of even higher surge. If you stay in your house in that situation, I’m sorry, you are going to face death. Not only that, even if you do survive the surge, will you survive being stuck on a deserted island with no drinkable water, food, utilities, or medical services? Will you be able to fight off any alligators after being taken in the surge to Chambers County? To summarize, GCOEM was telling us people were not leaving, so we needed to do something to get their attention. If you live in a storm surge area, you need to leave, or else you take your life into your own hands and you may not live.
As it happened, the storm fortunately turn more to the north about 6-12 hrs before landfall with a nice wobble. Still, with that, you had storm surge of 12-14 ft for Galveston Is, about 12 feet for Galveston Bay areas like Kemah and San Lean and even smatterings of 14-16 feet measurements. Some areas in the Houston Ship channel at 12 feet with isolated measurements of 14 feet. Supposedly there was as much as 20 feet in mouth of Trinity River. There was 15-17 ft surge for Bolivar and 17 feet across Chamber Co. Surge had pushed 15-17 miles inland across Chambers Co. These are all unofficial and preliminary surge numbers, but I’d figured I’d share a little here to give you the idea that even though we had 15-25 feet in our HLS, our low end number of 15 feet was well in range, and our 12-16 feet for Galveston was well on target. Our low end number was certainly on target for Bolivar, and looking at damage photos, it will be a while before Bolivar will recover if at all. So, yes, now people have an idea of what storm surge can do. I still think that given the meteorological data and the situation that people were not evacuating, we needed to use a CTA to get people’s attention that they need to evacuate. Your life is at stake. So yes, the death toll is not high, but you still have 300-350 people missing. You still have crews finding bodies in debris fields of Chambers Co. The fact is that some of these missing people will not be found. Even with the CTA, there were 40,000 people that did not evacuate from Galveston Is and about 400-500 people that did not evacuate from Bolivar (based off media and GCEOC). Some of these people required high water rescues on Friday, and by Friday afternoon, conditions became too dangerous to get the rest of them out. I have a huge respect for the emergency personnel that participated in the numerous rescues in dangerous conditions. Even by Friday morning you had most of Bolivar under water with flooded roadways due to surge.
I’m not sure where you get 150000 people not evacuating. Galveston Island may have 60,000 people on it total, and about 280,000 total population for the county. So, ya maybe 150,000 people of the whole county did not evacuate, but not all of Galveston Co was under a mandatory evacuation. It was just the storm surge areas under mandatory evacuation, but the rest of the inland area of the county was under voluntary evacuation. Most people along the Bay evacuated, it was mainly the folks on the island that did not leave. So, yes 40,000 people survived and did not face certain death. In that aspect I am glad they lived. I would have hated to see that many people dead. I would not be able to sleep at night knowing that 40,000 people died because I did not do everything possible to warn them. So yes, from that point of view, the certain death wording failed and I’m glad it did. But by your logic, if 40,000 people died, then the certain death wording would have succeeded. To me that is a grave failure because now you have 40,000 people dead. At the same time, I think the certain death wording did what it was designed to do. It got the attention of people to take this situation seriously and hopefully got people to act where as before they were not going to act. I hope that hearing the possibility of death people said, “You know, I think I need to evacuate.†The sad thing is that you still had 400 people left on Bolivar and I imagine a good chunk of those make up the 350 or so that are still missing.
Finally, I ask you, what would happen if we had not used such wording like “certain death†and there was 20-25ft of surge that wiped out thousands of people who did not evacuate? People would crucify the NWS because we did not warn them of this possibility when we had the data to support it. Ultimately, there would be a whole new staff at the NWS HGX office because of a Congressional investigation showing we did not do our job. Personally, I would have a hard time living knowing that I could have used better warnings to better convey the threat from the surge and save lives. I would much rather deal with people criticizing us for using certain death with people surviving than the alternative of not using such wording and having a bunch of people dead.
I have appreciated everyone’s candid opinion on this matter as I want to understand how our warnings impact people. I want to know that we are making a difference with what we do. Your thoughts have given me a good insight into how people respond to our warnings. Thank you for reading this long rant, and I apologize if I offend anyone with it. Again these are my views on the topic, not who I work for.
I have responded to this here in a new thread because it is a long response and will probably generate more discussion. My goal here is to provide a different perspective and if moderators feel it is not appropriate, please remove it or do with it as you please.
It has been one month since Ike hit Galveston. I have tried really hard to stay away from this topic since I am a forecaster in the very office that issued the HLS with the certain death wording. I even re-issued a couple of HLS’s with this wording in them because given the data and facts we had at the time, it seemed very appropriate. I have had some time to think about the events during Ike. With that said, I have stayed away because I realize it is much easier to criticize from afar, anonymously, and do so without all the facts of the situation.
While I do not feel obligated to answer critics, here is more detailed information that we based the decision to use certain death wordings in our HLS. The evacuation area we issued the certain death call to action (CTA) was for Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula. It just so happens that Chambers, Harris, Galveston, Brazoria, Matagorda and Jackson Counties are included in NHC’s hurricane warning which is the basis for the HLS. We cannot separate counties from this warning as it is not our local office’s warning. We can however segment out other counties for hurricane wind warnings, etc. The certain death call to action was placed in the storm surge part of the HLS because of a number of reasons.
First let’s look at some meteorological data for some background. The first HLS with the certain death CTA went out with the 15z Thu NHC advisory – advisory 42. The track from Wednesday to Thursday has shifted more to the north towards Galveston which increased the storm surge for Galveston. By this time, Ike was forecast to make landfall between Freeport and Galveston. This was also when the hurricane warning was issued for the area. Ike was a strong Cat 2 for wind intensity, but had a large wind field. This was a unique storm, different from a lot of hurricanes with this aspect. The large circulation center did not end up contracting, but the thinking was still for Ike to become a Cat 3. So, 36-48hrs out, we are still thinking of the possibility of a major hurricane. Not only that, but the storm surge data was coming in well within surge values associated with Cat 3/4 storms not Cat 2. SLOSH had storm surge of 15-17 feet for Galveston, 17-20 feet for Bolivar, 20-22 feet in the Bay, and as much as 23 feet in Trinity bay and Houston Ship Channel. Some of the later SLOSH runs had similar values but there were a few that were higher and a few with lower values. It really depended on the track of the storm and the intensity. A track shift of 20 miles made a significant change in storm surge. Even if the track is right, there can be as much as a 20% error in surge values from SLOSH. So, at the time, we did our best to convey what to expect but could not pinpoint more exact surge values for a given location. Our HLS at 15z Thu highlighted storm surge of 12-16 feet from Matagorda to High Island with 15-20 feet possible in both bays. The range of 15-25 feet in storm surge actually did occur in later HLS to account for error in the track and to convey the higher end of the threat. It also applied to Galveston Bay. Yes it is a big range, but breaking it down would not properly convey the threats given the possible errors in the track at the time Thursday. By Friday when the track was becoming more evident, we were able to use SLOSH to narrow down surge values for specific areas. We knew that surge of 15-20 feet was more likely, but at this time, what if the storm strengthened to a Cat 3? Wouldn’t 25 feet be possible just as much? What if the storm shifts at the last moment (which it did, and was a big reason why the surge was not more than 20 feet in some areas, but it very well could have shifted so that the surge was more)? The point being that Thursday morning, given the uncertainty in the forecast track and any track errors, given the surge values SLOSH was predicting, it made sense to use the certain death CTA to get people’s attention to this threat. People were not taking the threat seriously.
Now let’s add some situational awareness to the equation. At Thursday morning, Galveston Co was doing mandatory evacuations for the west end of Galveston and surge prone areas along Galveston bay like Kemah and San Leon. The people in these areas were not taking the evacuation seriously and people were slow to make any preparations. The Galveston Co OEM kept telling us that people were not getting out that needed to get out of surge areas. The people were not taking the threat of surge seriously. Galveston Co ended up issuing mandatory evacuations for all of Galveston starting noon Thursday which was after we issued the certain death CTA with the hurricane warning. People started to evacuate by this point. Given the meteorology and the fact that people were not evacuating, we continued the certain death CTA. People needed to get going and get out of surge prone areas. Let’s also add to the fact that this area had not had a major hurricane since Alicia in 1983. People here have no reference to what 15 feet of water will do to their houses if you only live at 4 feet above sea level. We have a major hurricane awareness conference every year in Houston, and do many preparedness talks every year, but people do not care until it is about to happen and by then it is too late. It had not happened to them for 25 years, a whole generation of people that have no clue about what a hurricane like Ike will do. You can remind them of Katrina all you want, but people here remember how Rita missed this area and they were stuck in traffic for 18 hours. At this point, as much as you tell people to be prepared ahead of time, it does no good when all they know is a traffic jam during the Rita evacuation. So, that leaves us with putting a seriously grim call to action to get people to understand the situation. Most of the general public have no reference for storm surge or any situational awareness to tell them to get out if 17 ft of water is coming for them. If you live on Bolivar where you are 3-5ft above sea level, and there is 17 feet of water not to mention wave action on top of that coming for you, you need to get off of Bolivar. No matter how high your house is built or how well, 12 feet of water will remove your house off its foundation. This also does not account for the possibility of even higher surge. If you stay in your house in that situation, I’m sorry, you are going to face death. Not only that, even if you do survive the surge, will you survive being stuck on a deserted island with no drinkable water, food, utilities, or medical services? Will you be able to fight off any alligators after being taken in the surge to Chambers County? To summarize, GCOEM was telling us people were not leaving, so we needed to do something to get their attention. If you live in a storm surge area, you need to leave, or else you take your life into your own hands and you may not live.
As it happened, the storm fortunately turn more to the north about 6-12 hrs before landfall with a nice wobble. Still, with that, you had storm surge of 12-14 ft for Galveston Is, about 12 feet for Galveston Bay areas like Kemah and San Lean and even smatterings of 14-16 feet measurements. Some areas in the Houston Ship channel at 12 feet with isolated measurements of 14 feet. Supposedly there was as much as 20 feet in mouth of Trinity River. There was 15-17 ft surge for Bolivar and 17 feet across Chamber Co. Surge had pushed 15-17 miles inland across Chambers Co. These are all unofficial and preliminary surge numbers, but I’d figured I’d share a little here to give you the idea that even though we had 15-25 feet in our HLS, our low end number of 15 feet was well in range, and our 12-16 feet for Galveston was well on target. Our low end number was certainly on target for Bolivar, and looking at damage photos, it will be a while before Bolivar will recover if at all. So, yes, now people have an idea of what storm surge can do. I still think that given the meteorological data and the situation that people were not evacuating, we needed to use a CTA to get people’s attention that they need to evacuate. Your life is at stake. So yes, the death toll is not high, but you still have 300-350 people missing. You still have crews finding bodies in debris fields of Chambers Co. The fact is that some of these missing people will not be found. Even with the CTA, there were 40,000 people that did not evacuate from Galveston Is and about 400-500 people that did not evacuate from Bolivar (based off media and GCEOC). Some of these people required high water rescues on Friday, and by Friday afternoon, conditions became too dangerous to get the rest of them out. I have a huge respect for the emergency personnel that participated in the numerous rescues in dangerous conditions. Even by Friday morning you had most of Bolivar under water with flooded roadways due to surge.
I’m not sure where you get 150000 people not evacuating. Galveston Island may have 60,000 people on it total, and about 280,000 total population for the county. So, ya maybe 150,000 people of the whole county did not evacuate, but not all of Galveston Co was under a mandatory evacuation. It was just the storm surge areas under mandatory evacuation, but the rest of the inland area of the county was under voluntary evacuation. Most people along the Bay evacuated, it was mainly the folks on the island that did not leave. So, yes 40,000 people survived and did not face certain death. In that aspect I am glad they lived. I would have hated to see that many people dead. I would not be able to sleep at night knowing that 40,000 people died because I did not do everything possible to warn them. So yes, from that point of view, the certain death wording failed and I’m glad it did. But by your logic, if 40,000 people died, then the certain death wording would have succeeded. To me that is a grave failure because now you have 40,000 people dead. At the same time, I think the certain death wording did what it was designed to do. It got the attention of people to take this situation seriously and hopefully got people to act where as before they were not going to act. I hope that hearing the possibility of death people said, “You know, I think I need to evacuate.†The sad thing is that you still had 400 people left on Bolivar and I imagine a good chunk of those make up the 350 or so that are still missing.
Finally, I ask you, what would happen if we had not used such wording like “certain death†and there was 20-25ft of surge that wiped out thousands of people who did not evacuate? People would crucify the NWS because we did not warn them of this possibility when we had the data to support it. Ultimately, there would be a whole new staff at the NWS HGX office because of a Congressional investigation showing we did not do our job. Personally, I would have a hard time living knowing that I could have used better warnings to better convey the threat from the surge and save lives. I would much rather deal with people criticizing us for using certain death with people surviving than the alternative of not using such wording and having a bunch of people dead.
I have appreciated everyone’s candid opinion on this matter as I want to understand how our warnings impact people. I want to know that we are making a difference with what we do. Your thoughts have given me a good insight into how people respond to our warnings. Thank you for reading this long rant, and I apologize if I offend anyone with it. Again these are my views on the topic, not who I work for.
